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MAFIC: Adaptive Packet Dropping for Cutting
Malicious Flows to Push Back DDoS Attacks
Yu Chen, Yu-Kwong Kwok, and Kai Hwang
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA
Abstract— In this paper, we propose a new approach
called MAFIC (MAlicious Flow Identification and Cutoff) to
support adaptive packet dropping to fend off DDoS attacks.
MAFIC works by judiciously issuing lightweight probes to
flow sources to check if they are legitimate. Through such
probing, MAFIC would drop malicious attack packets with
high accuracy while minimizes the loss on legitimate traf-
fic flows. Our NS-2 based simulation indicates that MAFIC
algorithm drops packets from unresponsive potental attack
flows with an accuracy as high as 99% and reduces the loss
of legitimate flows to less than 3%. Furthermore, the false
positive and negative rates are low–only around 1% for a
majority of the cases.
Index Terms—packet dropping policy, DDoS defense, ma-
licious flows, probing, duplicated ACKs.
I. INTRODUCTION
DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks have
been the most devastating assaults on the Internet [6], [7],
[13], [14]. A DDoS attack is simple to launch—flooding
the target host and/or the associated network links with
tremendous amount of packets that the victims are inca-
pable to handle. Legitimate traffic is then simply blocked
from reaching the victims. A plethora of defense and re-
sponse mechanisms have been suggested in the literature,
including packet traceback [1], packet filtering [9], [11],
[16], and pushback [2], [8].
Simply put, tackling DDoS attacks entails handling two
critical issues: (1) Accurately identifying the machines
participating in forwarding malicious flows; and (2) In-
cisively cutting off the malicious flows at those machines.
For example, in Figure 1, through some response mecha-
nisms (e.g., traceback), the victim may be able to identify
the ingress routers (with respect to the domain under pro-
tection) that participate in forwarding the malicious flows.
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Such routers are called Attack Transit Routers (ATRs) [2].
The next step is to instruct these ATRs to preferentially
block all malicious flows.
Unfortunately, accurately segregating malicious flows
from legitimate flows is very difficult, because of the fol-
lowing two practical issues: (1) IP source addresses of at-
tack packets are inevitably spoofed because both ingress
filtering [4] and egress filtering [18] are still far from
widely deployed; (2) It is inconceivable that all routers
across different autonomous systems (AS’s) would coop-
erate in inserting traceback path information [1].
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Fig. 1. An integrated DDoS pushback scheme, which identifies the
attack-transit routers (ATRs) and drops attack packets adaptively from
the malicious flows with spoofed source IP addresses.
In this paper, we propose an adaptive algorithm called
MAlicious Flow Identification and Cutoff (MAFIC). This
algorithm can accurately segregate potential malicious
flows from the legitimate flows and then cut these flows
off completely. MAFIC works by judiciously issuing
lightweight probes to flow sources to check the legitimacy.
MAFIC would then drop malicious attack packets with
very high accuracy, while minimizes the loss on legitimate
traffic flows.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents an overview of our recently proposed set-union
counting pushback technique for accurately identifying
ATRs. Section III contains the design of our proposed
MAFIC algorithm. In Section IV, we describe our NS-2
simulation setup and the performance metrics used. Sec-
tions 5 to 8 include the simulation results and their inter-
pretations. Section 9 concludes with some final remarks
and suggestions for further work.
II. REVIEW OF OUR PROPOSED SET-UNION
COUNTING PUSHBACK TECHNIQUE
In our recent study [2], we have proposed a low-
complexity practical technique for identifying the ingress
ATRs that unknowingly participate in forwarding mali-
cious flows. Our technique is based on accumulating very
light-weight statistics (requiring only O(log logn) stor-
age capacity [3]) at each router within the AS such that
when an abnormally huge volume of traffic arrives at a
particular last hop router (as shown in Figure 1), this vic-
tim router can quickly identify the ATRs with very high
accuracy.
Specifically, the core network is modeled (i.e., the net-
work of routers) as a directed graph G = (V,E), where V
is the set of routers Ri (i = 1, . . . , |V |) and E is the set of
directional links lij (i, j = 1, . . . , |V |). Furthermore, we
use the following key notation [10]:
• Si: The set of packets that originate from a source
router Ri (i.e., the packets are injected into the net-
work via this router); and
• Di: The set of packets that terminate at a destination
router Ri (i.e., the packets leave the core network via
this router).
Thus, to compute the traffic matrix A = {aij}, we need
to determine: aij = |Si ∩Dj |. Observe that the intersec-
tion computation can be transformed into a union opera-
tion [2]: aij = |Si ∩ Dj | = |Si| + |Dj | − |Si ∪ Dj |.
We can use counters at each router Ri to determine |Si|
and |Di|. However, we also need to compute |Si ∪ Dj |
efficiently. This can be done by the stochastic averaging
algorithm and the distributed max- merge algorithm [3].
By keeping track of the following values: |Si|, |Dj |,
and aij , we can determine whether a last hop router is
under an incipient DDoS attack. Specifically, if we find
that the value of |Dj | is abnormally high, then we can
infer that the router Rj is under a raging DDoS attack.
Then, we can identify the ATRs by checking the values of
aij for all ingress routers i.
However, one problem remains unsolved in our previ-
ous study is the next step–how to incisively blocking all
the malicious flows at such ATRs. Indeed, in [2] we only
used a simple proportionate packet dropping approach,
i.e., all packets, legitimate or malicious, are dropped with
the same probability. This is obviously not a satisfactory
approach because of the inevitable “collateral damages”
incurred.
III. MAFIC: ADAPTIVE MALICIOUS FLOW
IDENTIFICATION AND CUTOFF
In this section, we first describe the design rationale of
our proposed MAFIC algorithm, followed by a detailed
description of its packet dropping mechanisms.
A. Design Rationale
Our MAFIC algorithm handles two of major challenges
in identifying DDoS attack flows: source IP spoofing and
multiple distributed zombies utilization. There are two
scenarios at the extreme of the spectrum of IP spoofing.
On one hand, all source IP addresses are illegal or un-
reachable. On the other hand, all the attack packets carry
legitimate source IP addresses. Note that “legitimate”
means that the source IP addresses of a packet is a valid
address of a certain subnet within a certain AS. It does
not mean that the source IP address represents the true IP
address of the machine that launches the attack flows.
Our algorithm addresses DDoS attacks lying some-
where in between these two extreme cases, that is, some
IP addresses are bogus but some other are “legitimate”
in the above sense. For packets with illegal or unreach-
able source IP addresses, we place them in a data struc-
ture called Permanently Drop Table (PDT) and drop all
such kind of packets. The rationale is that although prob-
ably they are not part of the DDoS attack we are fighting
against, we believe that they do not belong to any normal
application. Furthermore, for packets carrying legitimate
source IP addresses, we use it as part of the label of a flow
instead of taking count on that to figure out the sender.
Then, all packets with the same label will be treated as
members of the same flow.
Many traffic management algorithms identify misbe-
having flows by monitoring and comparing their band-
widths with other flows sharing the link [5], [17]. One
problem arises when apply such an idea in packets classi-
fication against DDoS attacks. As multiple zombies are
used to launch the attack concurrently, the traffic from
each single zombie may behave well by occupying band-
width shares similar to general TCP like traffics, or even
less than that. Therefore, MAFIC algorithm adopts an
adaptive packets dropping policy that segregates the mali-
cious flows from others, and minimizes the impact on nor-
mal users flows. On receiving the notification of DDoS
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attack from the victim router, each ATR begins drop-
ping packets with certain probability and send duplicated
ACKs to hosts with source IP address. A Suspicious Flow
Table (SFT) is established and flows of those dropped
packets are recorded and a timer starts.
Meanwhile, the identified ATRs keep watching vari-
ances of arrival rate of these suspicious flows. If the ar-
rival rate of a flow decreases accordingly, it would be
moved from the SFT to the Nice Flow Table (NFT) as
it behaves in a TCP-friendly manner; otherwise, the unre-
sponsive flows will be added into PDT. Although not all
unresponsive flows originate from malicious attacks, their
non-TCP-friendly behaviors would not be helpful to relief
the victim from the flooding of packets. Since TCP based
flows consist more than 80% of network traffics [12] and
major parts of attacks use TCP protocol [14], the cost of
collateral damage on unresponsive legitimate traffic flows
is acceptable.
B. The MAFIC Algorithm
In this section, we describe the detailed mechanisms
of our proposed MAFIC algorithm. Although source
IP addresses are generally spoofed in attacking pack-
ets, they give us some useful information. Thus, the 4-
tuple {Source IP, Destination IP, Source
Port, Destination Port} is used as a label to
used to mark each flow in tables. Thus, in case multi-
ple flows originate from the same sender, each flow has a
unique flow ID and its own entry in SFT, NFT and PDT.
To minimize the storage overhead incurred by the ex-
tra lists added to implement our adaptive packets drop-
ping algorithm, we store only the output of a hash func-
tion with the label as the input instead of the label itself.
Figure 2 shows the control actions of the MAFIC algo-
rithm. One critical issue in the algorithm is the value of
the timer used to check if the flow behaves according to
the packet drop. Fortunately, RTT information is available
in most TCP traffic flows by checking the time stamp in
the packet header.
To allow for a moderate amount of time for the legiti-
mate sources to respond, we set the timer equal 2× RTT.
While a packet is dropped, the current time stamp is added
into the SFT along with the hashed label. Once there
are more packets belonging to this flow arrive, the time
stamps are compared with the record and the arrival rate
is updated. If a flow is found having lower sending rate
while the timer expires, it would be moved to NFT and
no more dropping will be done against its packets. On
the other hand, if the sending rate is not decreased, the
flow would be moved to PDT and all its future packets are
dropped.
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Fig. 2. The control flow of our proposed MAFIC algorithm. (NFT:
Nice Flow Table, SFT: Suspicious Flow Table, PDT: Permanently
Drop Table).
IV. SIMULATION SETUP AND PERFORMANCE
METRICS
We have implemented MAFIC algorithm in the NS-
2 simulator [15]. A subclass of Connector named
as LogLogCounter is added to the head of each
SimplexLink and a TrafficMonitor is coded into
the simulator to compute the traffic matrices [2]. The
LogLogCounter class is used to compute the sum-
mary of distinct packets traversed through each router.
When a packet is forwarded to a particular link by the
routing module on each node, the recv method of
LogLogCouter object associated with this link will
be called. While triggered by the victim node, the
LogLogCounter object begins to tentatively drop in-
coming packets targeting to the victim with certain prob-
ability, and put the flow into the SFT.
Then it keeps monitoring the packets arrival rate for
a time period of 2 × RTT. If the incoming rate of
the flow decreases accordingly, the LogLogCounter
object moves the flow into the NFT and will not drop
any packets belonging to this flow in the future; other-
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wise, it will put the flow into the PDT and all pack-
ets of that flow will be considered as malicious attacks
and dropped. The TrafficMonitor keeps track of
all LogLogCounter objects and for each time period,
it will be triggered to compute the traffic matrix for this
time period using the set-union counting algorithm. Our
notation used throughout our simulation results is listed in
Table I. The default settings of simulation parameters are
listed in Table II.
TABLE I
DEFINITION OF NOTATION
Symbol Definition
Pd SFT packet dropping probability
R Flow rate (packets/second)
Vt Traffic volume (total number of flows)
Γ Percentage of TCP flows
α Attacking packets dropping accuracy
N Domain size (number of routers)
β Traffic reduction rate
θp False positive rate
θn False negative rate
Lr Legitimate packets dropped rate in identifying
malicious flows
TABLE II
DEFAULT SETTING OF PARAMETERS
Parameter Default Value
Pd 90%
R 1× 106 packets/second
Vt 50 flows
Γ 95%
N 40 routers
V. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
A. Attacking Packet Dropping Accuracy
In this section, we present our results on attacking
packet dropping accuracy. This parameter indicates how
accurate the SFT/PDT mechanism can identify the attack
packets and drop them. Specifically, we define the ac-
curacy as the percentage of dropped malicious packets
among total number of malicious packets that arrive at the
ATRs. Figure 3 shows the attacking packet dropping ac-
curacy under different traffic volumes. We can see that the
MAFIC algorithm is robust because the accuracy is con-
sistently within the range of 99.2% to 99.8% even under
dramatically different traffic conditions.
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Fig. 3. Attack packet dropping accuracy of the proposed MAFIC
algorithm under different traffic conditions.
B. Performance of Flow Cutting
To fighting against DDoS attacks, the responsiveness
of the defense scheme is one of the most critical consid-
erations. Figure 4 shows the results of variations of flow
bandwidth before and after the MAFIC algorithm is in-
voked. We can see that as soon as the MAFIC algorithm
is triggered, routers begin to drop packets having destina-
tion addresses matching the victims address.
As shown in Figure 4(a), arrival rate at victim is cut off
very quickly within a time period of 2 × RTT. By set-
ting the dropping probability to 90%, the flows targeting
at the victim link are reduced to about 95%. The results
also indicate that the arrival rates are cut down by 85%
and 80% while we set the dropping probability equals to
80% and 70%, respectively. In Figure 4(b), 95% of flows
in total traffic volume are TCP flows. We can see that
packet rates decrease drastically as soon as our adaptive
dropping algorithm triggered into its probing phase. It is
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important to note that after the cutting of potential attack-
ing flows (i.e., unresponsive flows), the legitimate traffic
flows regain their bandwidth shares after passing the test
in the probing phase. These results indicate that MAFIC
algorithm responses quickly and possesses good scalabil-
ity.
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Fig. 4. Traffic reduction rates and flow bandwidth variations of the
proposed MAFIC algorithm under different traffic conditions.
C. Effects on False Alarm Rates
False positive rate (θp) and false negative rate (θn)
are important QoS parameters to characterize the perfor-
mance of detection algorithms against network attacks.
False positive rate is defined as the percentage of legit-
imate packets wrongly dropped as malicious attacking
packets out of the total traffic packets. False negative
rate is the percentage of attacking packets that were not
dropped or hidden in the traffic to hit the victim node
across the defense line without being detected. While
θp indicates the sensitivity and accuracy of the detector,
it also evaluates the impact on well-behaved applications.
On the other hand, θn reflects the effectiveness of the algo-
rithm against malicious attacks. There is always a tradeoff
between the intrusion detection rate and the false alarm
rate.
Our simulation results on false alarm rates are plotted
in Figures 5 and 6. We can see that the values of θp are
very low–bounded above by 0.06% for all three cases un-
der different traffic conditions. In general, θp increases
with the total traffic volume and percentage of TCP flows.
But θp ceases to increase and even starts to drop when the
dropping probability (Pd) becomes very high. Similarly,
θn drops for high TCP or high total traffic volumes. In
general, θn reduces with increasing traffic volume. But θn
increases again when the traffic exceeds a certain limit.
D. Dropping Rate of Legitimate Packets
The legitimate-packet dropping rate (Lr) is defined as
the number of packets in well-behaved flows dropped
during the probing phase and the subsequent dropping
process. Lr indicates the degree of severity of the in-
evitable “collateral damage”. Figure 7 shows the results
of Lr during the probing phase corresponding to different
packet dropping probabilities. We see that even with very
high dropping probability (70%, 80%, and 90%), the costs
of legitimate flows are insignificant. Furthermore, as the
total traffic volume grows, the Lr tends to be stable and
converges to the value of about 1%.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a novel scheme for ma-
licious flow identification and cutoff called MAFIC. We
implemented the adaptive packet dropping and probing al-
gorithm. By monitoring the response to packet loss from
the flow source, malicious attacking flows are accurately
identified and all their packets are then dropped before
reaching the victim. Our extensive NS-2 based simulation
results shows that MAFIC responses quickly to reduce the
traffic rate by limiting flow bandwidth incisively. Indeed,
MAFIC can identify and cut off malicious flows with very
high accuracy and minimized impact on the performance
of legitimate application flows, especially when major ap-
plications use TCP protocol.
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